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Election Redistricting: A Call For Reform
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty-four years, the judiciary has played an
active role in monitoring election redistricting on the federal, state
and local levels. Redistricting disputes have involved claims that
newly created voting districts discriminated against a certain group
by either containing population inequalities or having "gerrymandered" districts. Throughout this period, the Supreme Court
and the federal district courts have attempted to develop judicially
manageable standards by which these claims can be tested. Unfortunately, these standards have failed to ensure "fair and effective"
representation, and have promoted systemic inefficiency.
This comment discusses the methods that legislatures employ to
dilute a particular group's voting strength. Next, it traces the
Supreme Court's entry into the redistricting "thicket," and identifies the myriad of standards the Court has developed. The comment then analyzes the inadequacies of these standards and the
unconstitutionality of current redistricting procedure, which gives
the majority party of the legislative branch the power to draw the
election districts. Finally, the comment suggests a more effective
approach to redistricting.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Methods of Vote Dilution

The election process in the United States is primarily "district
based"; legislative bodies are required to draw district boundaries
for the election of political representatives.' As a result, manipulation of the process often becomes an irresistible temptation. Legislatures have employed several techniques over the years to
accomplish this end. Until 1964, legislatures often malapportioned
election districts to dilute minority votes, that is, they established
districts with widely varying populations. 2 Since 1964, however,
1. Clinton, FurtherExplorations In the Political Thicket: The Gerrymanderand the
Constitution, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1973).
2. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering:A Remaining
Obstacle in the Quest for Fairand Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 276, 278.
The makeup of the Tennessee legislative districts at the time of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), see infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text, is an example of malapportionment. The Tennessee legislative districts had not been apportioned (redrawn) since 1901.
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the Supreme Court has required population equality among election districts within one political entity.3 In light of this requirement, legislatures have turned to equipopulous gerrymandering as
a method of diluting the voting strength of particular groups.4
Gerrymandering is discriminatory districting that unfairly increases one group's political strength while decreasing that of another.' Gerrymandering usually disperses votes of a targeted
group6 in several districts where those votes will be wasted in support of losing candidates7 or concentrates the group in one district
where it can only elect one candidate of its choice.'
A massive shift in population from the rural counties to the urban counties occurred
during the interim. Thus, extreme disparities existed in the number of voters in different
districts. For example, Moore County (rural) had 2340 voters and elected one representative, while Shelby County (urban), with 312,345 voters, elected only seven. This
scheme allowed voters in districts containing only 40% of the voting population to elect
63 of the 99 representatives and voters in districts containing only 37% of the population
to elect 30 of the 33 senators. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 254. The rural population thus controlled the state legislature, even though
most of the population had moved to the urban areas.
3. See infra notes 23-34.
4. Equipopulous gerrymandering is districting that satisfies the one person, one vote
standard yet still uses gerrymandering techniques to discriminate against an identifiable
group of voters. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 278 n.5.
5. Dixon, The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote", in REAPPORTIONMENT
IN THE 1970's, at 7, 29 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
The practice that became known as gerrymandering dates back to 1705, when the
Pennsylvania colonial legislature sought to keep political power in the rural eastern counties by using a representational structure that discriminated against Philadelphia residents. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 280.
The term "gerrymandering" was born in 1812, when Governor Elridge Gerry permitted the Massachusett legislature to draw a "salamander-like" electoral district in Essex
County. Clinton, supra note 1, at 1. This district was part of a statewide effort to dilute
the effectiveness of Federalist voters. The effort was successful, as Democrats won 29 of
40 senate seats while losing the popular vote 50,164 to 51,766. Engstrom, supra note 2, at
279-80 (citing E. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 20
(1907)).
6. The "targeted group" is a group that the current majority in the legislative branch
is trying to keep underrepresented. In most cases, the targeted group is a racial'or ethnic
group or the current minority party. A target group will hereinafter be referred to as a
"minority group." These groups are represented by a minority of the legislature, but they
may in fact comprise a majority of the population in a particular political unit. See supra
note 2 and infra notes 14 and 27.
7. Clinton, supra note 1, at 3. This tactic is often called "fracturing." See Ketchum
v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 n.8 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2673 (1985).
Through fracturing, a targeted minority group which would have a sizeable majority in
one district (thus enabling it to elect a representative) is split among two or more districts
where the group is unable to elect a representative. See infra notes 150-82 and accompanying text for an example of the effects of fracturing.
8. This tactic is often called "packing." Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 n.7
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2673 (1985). When a targeted minority group is
packed into one or more districts (comprising 70% or more of the voting population)
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Today, the Court treats equipopulous gerrymandering and malapportionment as two distinct issues. Malapportionment cases address how close to perfect population equality the districts must be,
whereas equipopulous gerrymandering cases focus on whether a
redistricting scheme unfairly inflates the political strength of one
group at the expense of another, despite population equality among
electoral districts.
B. Entering the Thicket
Prior to the 1960's, the Supreme Court refused to hear suits alleging that electoral district boundaries were malapportioned or
gerrymandered. The Court dismissed these suits "for want of equity," 9 holding that they involved political questions and were
therefore not "meant for judicial determination." 10 Consequently,
the judiciary refused to enter the "political thicket" of
redistricting. I'
The Warren Court finally attacked the redistricting issue head
on12 in Baker v. Carr.'13 The plaintiffs in Baker claimed that the
Tennessee reapportionment statute created gross population inequalities in the state's voting districts, resulting in a violation of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 4 The Court in a
6-2 opinion held that the courts had jurisdiction over the subject
every vote in excess of the votes needed to elect the candidate (never more than 50% plus
one) is a "wasted" vote which minimizes minority voting power in other districts. Id.; see
also Clinton, supra note 1, at 3-4.
For a discussion of various gerrymandering techniques, see Bankstrom, Issues in Gerrymandering.: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan GerrymanderingApplied to Minnesota,
62 MINN. L. REV. 1121 (1978).
9. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551 (1946).
10. Id. at 552.
11. Id. at 556.
12. Technically, the Court first entered the "thicket" in the 1960 gerrymandering
case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (holding that an Alabama statute which sought to exclude eligible Black voters from the city of Tuskegee's boundaries
violated the fifteenth amendment). Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinions
in both Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text, and Gomillion, distinguished Gomillion from Colegrove by noting that Colegrove involved discrimination under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause,
whereas Gomillion relied on the fifteenth amendment. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
14. Id. at 187-88. The Tennessee legislature had last reapportioned the voting districts in 1901. By 1960, the number of voters in representative districts varied from
42,298 to 2340. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS 120 (1968); see also supra note 27.
For excellent discussions and analyses of the Baker decision, see R. DIXON, supra, at
119-71; Neal, supra note 2, at 253-377.
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matter, 1 5 that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain the suit,' 6 and
that the claims were justiciable.I7 The Court then remanded the
case to the district court.'" Unfortunately, beyond requiring that
apportionment be "fair," the Supreme Court, when it applied
Baker in subsequent cases, 19 failed to set forth standards for the
lower courts to follow.
The Baker decision opened the floodgates for redistricting litigation.20 Subsequent cases may be divided into two major groups.
The malapportioned district cases, which are quantitative in
nature, distinguish between congressional districts and state legislative districts.2 ' The other cases address equipopulous gerrymandering and are qualitative in nature.22
C. The Malapportionment Cases
1. The Origins of One Person, One Vote
Two years after Baker, the Court decided that fairness in redistricting required that "as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote
.. . is to be worth as much as another's. ' 23 Thus, in order to
ensure "fair and effective representation,

' 24

the one person, one

vote standard, requiring substantial population equality among
15. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id. at 237. The Court in Baker distinguished rather than overruled Colegrove, see
supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text, stating that Colegrove was dismissed because of
"want of equity," not on justiciability grounds. Baker, 369 U.S. at 234.
18. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
19. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964).
20. After Baker, suits were filed in two-thirds of the states challenging the apportionment of state legislatures. R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (1979).
"Apportionment" is the "allocation of seats in a legislative body to previously specified
geographic areas," while "districting" is "the designation of territorial units from which
legislators are elected." The terms reapportionment and redistricting are now used interchangeably in referring to the rearrangement of representational districts. Engstrom,
Post-Census RepresentationalDistricting: The Supreme Court, "One Person, One Vote,"
And the GerrymanderingIssue, 7 So. U.L. REV. 173 n.1 (1980).
21. These cases are quantitative in nature because they analyze the population variances among districts. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
22. These cases are qualitative in nature because although the districts have population equality, they are drawn so as to discriminate against a certain group. See infra
notes 61-100 and accompanying text.
23. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The word "person" was substituted
for the word "man" in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 330 (1973). Several commentators theorized that the Supreme Court changed the slogan in deference to the women's rights movement. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 278 n.3.
24. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
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election districts, was born.25
In enunciating this principle in Reynolds v. Sims, 26 a state legislature malapportionment case, the Court based its holding on the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 27 The Court, acknowledging that it was dealing with a "new and developing area
of the law,"' 28 did not develop a precise constitutional test to be
followed by lower courts enforcing this one person, one vote standard.29 Rather, the Court preferred to deal with population disparities among election districts on a case-by-case basis. 30 The
Court adopted this approach because it believed varying circumstances could make what is permissible in one state unsatisfactory
in another.3" Thus, after Reynolds, states were required to reapportion their districts according to the very general and undeveloped edict of substantial population equality among districts.
Furthermore, it was unclear whether the Court would utilize different standards for congressional and state reapportionment. In
Wesberry v. Sanders, 2 a congressional malapportionment case,33
the court reached the one person, one vote conclusion by relying,
not on the fourteenth amendment as in Reynolds, but on article I,
25. Id. at 558; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
26. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
27. Id. at 564-68. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Court in Reynolds struck down Alabama's 60-year-old apportionment plan under
which 35 counties, ranging in population from 635,000 to 15,000 (a 41 to 1 ratio), each
elected one senator. The house districts ranged in population from 104,767 to 6731 (a 16
to 1 ratio). As a result, representatives of about 25% of the electorate constituted a
majority in both houses. The Court also struck down a proposed state constitutional
amendment containing population variances from 42,303 to 10,727 among the House
districts, and a "standby" statutory measure with population variances from 52,000 to
20,000 among the House districts. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536-51.
On the same day that Reynolds was decided, the Court struck down election apportionment schemes in several other states because of population inequalities among districts.
The companion cases were Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964) (New York); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(Colorado).
28. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585.
29. Id. at 578, 585.
30. Id. at 578.
31. Id.
32. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. The Georgia congressional districts in Wesberry ranged in population from
823,680 to 272,154. Id. at 2.
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section 2 of the Constitution. 34 This lack of consistency generated
confusion and uncertainty when states reapportioned their congressional and legislative districts. It also led to years of litigation
to determine what "substantial equality" among congressional and
legislative districts meant.
2.

Applying One Person, One Vote
a. FederalElections
Following the Court's enunciation of the one person, one vote
standard, the analysis focused upon how much variance from absolute population equality would be tolerated. In congressional districting cases, the Court has strictly applied the one person, one
35 the Court developed a
vote principle. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
two-pronged test for determining when article I, section 2, under
the "as nearly as practicable" standard, permits population variances among congressional districts.36 Under this test, variances
will be upheld only if the state made a good-faith effort to achieve
precise mathematical equality (the unavoidability prong),3 7 or if
the state could justify each variance, no matter how small (the justification prong). 38 The Court has, by rejecting almost every possible reason for population disparities among congressional districts,
made it almost impossible for a state to meet the justification
prong. 39 The population equality requirement has thus become the
sole criterion for determining the constitutionality of congressional
redistricting under article I, section 2. 40 The Court has used this
absolute equality test to demand almost precise population equality
34. Id. at 7-9. Article I, § 2 states in part: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States .. .
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
35. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
36. Id. at 530-31; Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969).
37. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-3 1; see also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546
(1969). Under the unavoidability prong, the party challenging the redistricting legislation has the burden of showing that the legislature had plans with smaller maximum
population deviations than the plan passed. If the party can do this, a lack of "goodfaith" effort by the state has been demonstrated. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531-33.
38. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31.
39. Id. at 531-33. The Court stated that the following reasons would not justify population disparities in congressional districting: Avoiding fragmented areas with distinct
economic and social interests; avoiding partisan politics, thereby decreasing the opportunities for gerrymandering; avoiding fragmented political subdivisions; and attempting to
ensure geographical "compactness" of the districts. Id. at 533-36. By contrast, the Court
in Reynolds recognized that preserving political subdivisions and ensuring geographical
"compactness" would justify deviations from population equality in state legislative redistricting. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
40. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973).
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among congressional districts.4" Court application of this test has
been accompanied by strong criticism. Dissenters have argued that
the strict population equality standard may lead to gerrymandering4 2 and violate doctrines mandating separation of powers and judicial economy.43
b.

State Elections"

After 1970, a clear dichotomy developed between the degree of
population equality required among congressional districts and
that required among state legislative districts.45 Population disparities among the state legislative districts are constitutional under the
fourteenth amendment if they are " '[b]ased on legitimate consider41. The following are cases in which the Court invalidated plans with total maximum
population deviations of less than 15%: Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)
(0.69%); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (4.13%); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542 (1969) (13.1%); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (5.97%).
Total maximum deviation is calculated by adding the total percentages by which the
most populous and least populous districts vary from the mathematical ideal of perfect
equality. For example, if the mathematical ideal is 10,000 people per district, and the
largest district exceeds this ideal by two percent (10,200) while the smallest district is
under the ideal by three percent (9700), the total maximum deviation will be five percent.
42. Justice Harlan in his Kirkpatrick dissent stated:
[T]he rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with "gerrymandering"
of the worst sort. A computer may grind out district lines which can totally
frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues ....
[D]istrict lines are likely to be drawn to maximize the political advantage of the
party temporarily dominant in public affairs.
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Justice White in his Kirkpatrick dissent observed: "Not only will the Court's new
rule necessarily precipitate a new round of congressional and legislative districting, but
also I fear that in the long run the courts, rather than the legislatures or nonpartisan
commissions, will be making most of the districting decisions in the several states." Id. at
556 (White, J., dissenting).
44. Although the application of the one person, one vote standard to local elections
will not be discussed in this section, the Court has extended this doctrine to local
government elections. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), in which
the court stated:
[A]s a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select
persons by popular election to perform governmental functions [equal
protection] requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal
opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an elected
body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a
basis which will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can
vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials. Id. at 56.
Thus, after Hadley, it became apparent that the Court would hold local governments
to the same standards as state governments, see infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text,
with respect to redistricting.
45. Compare Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) with Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735 (1973) and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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ations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy' ",46 and
if they do not exceed constitutional limits. 7 This test has been
applied only when population deviations in state legislative districts exceed ten percent.4" Deviations of less than ten percent do
not require justification by the state (when population disparity is
the sole claim) because such deviations are considered insufficient
to create a prima facie case of invidious discrimination 49 under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.5" The Court has
adopted this less stringent standard5 1 to give states more flexibility
in state legislative redistricting than is available in congressional
redistricting. A majority of the Justices believe that greater flexibility is needed because there are significantly 52more state legislative
election districts than congressional districts.
By applying this less exacting standard, the Court allows legislatures to follow political subdivision lines to establish election districts. This, the Court believes, is the easiest method available for
creating numerous districts. 53 Furthermore, preserving political
subdivisions ensures a voice in the state legislature for each political subdivision. This is an important consideration because many
of the legislature's activities involve local legislation affecting only
particular subdivisions.54
The dissenters in these closely divided state legislative district
decisions argued that the strict test applied to congressional districts should also be applied to state redistricting schemes. The
dissenters believed that precise population equality is the paramount goal of reapportionment, and that the equal protection
clause did not relegate this goal to secondary status for state legislative districts. 5 Furthermore, the dissenters objected to the
46. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 579 (1964)). Preserving political boundaries is a rational state interest, id. at 325-26,
as is manipulation of districts to achieve a rough approximation of the statewide political
strengths of the Democratic and Republican parties. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 752 (1973).
47. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973) (16.9% maximum population deviation does not exceed constitutional limits).
48. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 776-77 (1973); White v. Regester (companion case), 412 U.S. 755, 776-77 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting in Gaffney and concurring
in part, dissenting in part in Regester).
49. See infra notes 81-100 for a discussion of invidious discrimination.
50. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973).
51. See supra notes 35-41 for a discussion of the more stringent "absolute equality"
test for congressional districts.
52. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973).
53. Id. at 321.
54. Id. at 321-22.
55. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 776-77 (1973); White v. Regester (compan-
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Court's apparently
arbitrary adoption of a ten percent de minimis
6
deviation.
range
These two different reapportionment standards have created tremendous disparities between the population variations allowed for
congressional and state legislative districts. For example, the "absolute equality" standard used for congressional districts has invalidated a redistricting plan with as little as a 0.69 percent total
maximum population deviation,5 7 while application of the "rational justification" standard for state legislative districts has upheld a redistricting plan with an eighty-nine percent total
Furthermore, since the "ramaximum population deviation.
tional justification" standard depends on the particular state interest present in each factual setting, decisions upholding or
invalidating a legislative redistricting plan will have limited precedential value. 9 As a result, the question of how much deviation
from equal population is constitutionally tolerable under the one
person, one vote standard remains largely unanswered.
The one person, one vote standard has at least curbed the indiscriminate use of gross population disparities among districts to dilute the voting strength of targeted groups. Population inequality,
however, is not the only way to dilute votes. Equipopulous gerrymandering, described by Justice Douglas as "the other half of
Reynolds v. Sims,"6 0 has been used by state legislatures to dilute
votes while adhering to the one person, one vote standard.
D.

Equipopulous Gerrymandering

The party controlling the election redistricting process can deflate the voting strength of many groups by gerrymandering the
election districts. For example, gerrymandering tactics have been
used to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities6" and minorion case), 412 U.S. 755, 776-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Gaffney and concurring in part,
dissenting in part in Regester).
56. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 776-77 (1973); White v. Regester (companion case), 412 U.S. 755, 776-77 (1973). It appears that a 10% de minimis range deviation
exists since the districting plan in Regester contained a 9.9% total maximum deviation.
Id. at 761.
57. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983).
58. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 839 (1983).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 846 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 315, 334 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. See infra notes 66-93, 150-82 and accompanying text. This practice is often
called "racial gerrymandering." Racial gerrymandering has been attacked under the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See supra
note 12; infra notes 66-100, 150-82 and accompanying text.
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ity political parties. 62 Gerrymandering can be accomplished by unfairly delineating the district boundaries or by creating
discriminatory multimember district schemes.63
1.

Delineation of Representational District Boundaries

Whether discriminatory representational districting exists depends on whether a portion of a group's population 64 is fairly contained in an election district's boundaries.6 5
Wright v.
Rockefeller,6 6 the first case to address this representative districting
issue, 67 concerned a racial gerrymandering claim involving four
congressional districts. 68 The districts were allegedly drawn to
concentrate Blacks and Puerto Ricans into one district.69 This resulted in one district comprised of 86.3 percent Blacks and Puerto
Ricans, while the other three districts were comprised of only 5.1
percent, 28.5 percent and 27.5 percent Blacks and Puerto Ricans. °
Blacks and Puerto Ricans sued, claiming that the districting
62. See infra notes 75-78, 107-49 and accompanying text. This practice is often
called "partisan gerrymandering." Partisan gerrymandering has been attacked on fourteenth amendment grounds. Id.
63. Gerrymandering generally occurs when legislatures delineate district boundaries
during the first year of each decade. Election districts in every state and city are reapportioned after each decennial census. In most states and cities, reapportionment is a legislative function. 62 C.J.S. States § 62 (1977). For example, the Illinois constitution
provides: "In the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b) (1970).
Similarly, an Illinois statute provides that: "On or before the first day of December of
the year following the year in which the national census is taken... the City Council [of
Chicago] shall by ordinance redistrict the city on the basis of the national census of the
preceding year." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
21-38 (1985).
The majority party can discriminate against minority groups when it redistricts, because the majority, through its voting power, controls which map will be passed. See
infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
64. A "group" can be a racial group, such as Blacks or Hispanics, or a partisan group
such as Democrats or Republicans.
65. Jewell, Minority Representation: A Politicalor JudicialQuestion, 53 Ky. L.J. 267,
274 (1965).
66. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
67. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court had previously addressed the issue of the constitutionality of district lines. During redistricting, the legislature changed the previously square-shaped city boundary into a twenty-eight-sided figure.
The Court, relying on the fifteenth amendment, invalidated the district as a blatant attempt at racial gerrymandering designed to eliminate all Black voters from the city's
boundaries. Id. at 340-41, 347-48. Gomillion had little precedential value because it did
not address the issue of representational districting. This issue was not addressed since
all Blacks had been completely excluded from the district.
68. 376 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).
69. One of the districts had an eleven-sided, step-shaped boundary. Id. at 60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 59 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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scheme created racially segregated districts in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 7 ' The Court upheld the scheme
72
because the plaintiffs failed to prove improper legislative intent.
The Court stated that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden because they did not show that the plan was intended by the state to
segregate on the basis of race. 73 This requirement of improper legislative intent was criticized by the dissent as establishing an impossible burden of proof for complainants.74
The Court has also faced delineation issues involving partisan
gerrymandering.7 5 The Court found that legislative redistricting
plans prepared by a bipartisan committee which drew the districts
with the goal of proportional state wide representation7 6 did not
violate the fourteenth amendment.7 7 In fact, the Court has appar18
ently endorsed such attempts at "political fairness."1

71. Wright, 376 U.S. at 54.
72. Id. at 56. This intent requirement has also been called the "invidious discrimination" requirement. In promulgating this intent standard, the Court stated that the plaintiff "failed to prove that the New York legislature was either motivated by racial
considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines." Id.
73. Id. at 58.
74. Id. at 73 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
75. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
76. Id. at 735, 738. The wasted voting strength of one political party, which was
concentrated in one area of the state, was offset by constructing gerrymandered districts
which wasted the opposing party's votes in other areas of the state. Engstrom, supra note
2, at 293.
77. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973). The opposing party claimed
that this plan was a political gerrymander which was invidiously discriminatory under
the fourteenth amendment.
78. The Court in Gaffney v. Cummings stated: "The very essence of districting is to
produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be reached with elections at large .. " Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). The court continued: "[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to
allocate political power to parties in accordance with their voting strength, and, within
quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so." Id. at 754.
A similar type of "fairness" gerrymander was challenged in United Jewish Org. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). New York, in a deliberate attempt to increase the non-white
majority in certain state legislative districts in order to encourage the election of more
non-white representatives, changed the size ofnon-white majorities in certain districts.
Id. at 162-66. As a result, a community of Hasidic Jews, previously located entirely in
one assembly district, was split between two assembly districts. Id. at 152. The plaintiffs
alleged that the state's use of racial criteria and quotas in developing the reapportionment
plan violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights of the Jewish community by
diluting the value of their vote by half. Id. at 152-53. The Court upheld the plan, finding
that no racial or political groups were forced out of the political process and that Jewish
voting strength was not invidiously minimized. Id. at 155-69. Relying on Gaffney, the
court agreed that a plan "seeking to alleviate the consequences of racial voting at the
polls and to achieve a fair allocation of political power between white and non-white
voters in King County" was a legitimate state end and therefore constitutional. Id. at
167.
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Use of Multimember Districts

Another method of diluting the electoral impact of a minority
group's voting strength involves the use of multimember districts.
In this system, two or more representatives are elected from a single district. 9 The minority group, which might have been able to
elect some representatives if the multimember districts had been
broken down into several single-member districts, cannot elect any
representatives in the larger district.8 0
When the Court first addressed the multimember redistricting
issue in the mid-1960's, it held that multimember districts are not
unconstitutional per se. A party challenging the use of multimember districting bears the burden of proving that the scheme is invidiously discriminatory.8 1 This can be accomplished by showing that
the scheme operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of certain racial or political elements.82 For example, the plaintiffs
might introduce evidence that the minority party would have won
more seats if a single district system had been used. 3
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,84 the Court applied this invidious vote
dilution test. The plaintiffs, primarily poor black residents of
Marion County, Indiana, claimed that single-member districting
would ensure that Marion County's (including Indianapolis)
ghetto could elect three members to the House and one to the Senate, whereas the multimember scheme enabled competing interest
groups in the county to cancel out the Black vote. 85 The plaintiffs
79. Banzhaf, Multi-Member ElectoralDistricts-DoThey Violate the "One Man, One
Vote" Principle?,75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966).
For example, assume that State A has a population of 10,000 people per district. If the
state contained all single-member districts, then one representative would be elected from
each district. If a multimember district were created, then the district would contain
30,000 people from which three representatives would be elected at large.
The use of multimember districts is called "institutional gerrymandering." It differs
from the other form of vote dilution known as "delineation gerrymandering," which is
accomplished by the strategic drawing or placement of representational district boundaries to discriminate against a particular target group. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 280
n.20.
See Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts.: Legal and Empirical
Issues, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 108 (1982).
80. Grofman, supra note 79, at 108. For a critique of multimember districting, see
Banzhaf, supra note 79, at 1309.
81. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); see also Forstom v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965).
82. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). The Court has noted that the term
"political minority" includes partisan as well as racial minorities. Id. at 88 n. 14.
83. Id. at 129.
84. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
85. Id. at 129.
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thus alleged that this scheme invidiously diluted their votes under
the equal protection clause. 86 After detailed fact finding, the district court, relying on the invidious discrimination test, found that
poor voters in Marion County's ghetto area represented a cognizable interest group and that the plan diluted the effect of their
votes.87

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove invidious discrimination. 88 The Court recited the
invidious discrimination test, but added a new element-whether
the group in question had less opportunity than the other residents
in the county to take part in the political process.89 The Court
found nothing in the record to indicate that poor Blacks were not
allowed to register and join the political party of their choice. The
Court also found that the plaintiffs were not excluded from either
major party's slates and that they were not denied the chance to
occupy legislative seats. 9° The dissent 91 claimed that the invidious
discrimination test was satisfied by a showing of invidious effects,
and that the test did not require a showing of intentional racial
discrimination by the legislature. 92 The dissent argued that the
new political participation test placed an impossible demand on
Blacks. 93
For twelve years, a sharply divided Court continued to apply the
Whitcomb invidious discrimination test, 94 rejecting the argument
that discriminatory impact alone was sufficient to prove vote dilution. 95 During this time, only one multimember districting scheme
was invalidated by the Court.96
86. Id.
87. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
88. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Justice Douglas wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id.
at 171.
92. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 177-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 180. Justice Douglas stated: "It is asking the impossible for us to demand
that the Blacks first show that the effect of the scheme was to discourage or prevent poor
Blacks from voting or joining such party as they choose." Id.
The standard appeared particularly harsh because Whitcomb "went to the Supreme
Court with a record equal to any the plaintiffs will generally be able to establish in a
Clinton, supra note 1, at 19.
gerrymandering case ....
94. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that § 2
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 simply reiterated the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment; thus invidious discrimination was still required).
95. Id.
96. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). At issue in Regester was the creation of
multimember legislative districts in two Texas counties. Id. at 756. The Court, in a
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In 1982 Congress, unhappy with the Supreme Court's standard
for racial gerrymandering claims under the fifteenth amendment
and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (judicially construed to parallel the fifteenth amendment), 97 amended the act. Congress
adopted a standard requiring plaintiffs to prove only that the result
of the election scheme had an adverse impact on a racial minority. 98 The legislative history of the amendment expressly stated
that this "results test" was intended to replace the Court's invidious discrimination test.99 A Senate committee report listed numerous "typical"
and "objective"
factors which indicate
discriminatory "results." These include examples of past discrimination in the political subdivision which have affected a minority
group's ability to register, vote, or otherwise participate in the
democratic process; and a history of lack of proportional
representation. 100
III.

DISCUSSION

After the Burger Court's round of redistricting cases in the
1970's, it is evident that members of the Court remain divided on
this issue. 101 The Court's standard varies depending upon whether
the issue is malapportionment or gerrymandering.102 For malapportionment claims, the standards differ between state and congressional districting. 01 3 The standards for gerrymandering claims
also differ. Proof of invidious discrimination still is required for
partisan gerrymandering claims under the fourteenth amendment,"° while only discriminatory results are necessary to prove
racial gerrymandering under the fifteenth amendment and section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. 105 Furthermore, these standards are
constantly changing.' 06 The 1980 census led to redistricting
unanimous opinion, declared the plan unconstitutional because it violated the Whitcomb
standards. The Court accepted the district court's finding of fact that there was a long
history of official discrimination in Texas, which affected the rights of Blacks to register,
vote and participate in the democratic process. Id. at 766-69.
97. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). See infra note 158 for the text of
the act.
98. 48 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
99. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 205 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 99, at 28-29, 143-44.
101. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 165 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. See supra notes 57-59, 97-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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throughout the country and further litigation for the Court in the
1980's. The inadequacy of present approaches to these issues is
demonstrated by the following cases.
A.

Malapportionment-Karcherv. Daggett

The 1983 case of Karcher v. Daggett 107 was the Court's first significant reapportionment case involving the redistricting that occurred after the 1980 census. At issue in Karcher was whether a
New Jersey apportionment plan for congressional districts, with a
total maximum deviation of less than one percent, is constitutional
per se under article 1, section 2 of the Constitution. 08 The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 plurality opinion, 10 9 held that such a plan
is not per se constitutional. 110
Justice Brennan, applying the Kirkpatrick absolute equality
test,"' first addressed the issue of good faith in districting. The
state contended that a maximum deviation of less than one percent
112
was per se a good-faith effort to achieve population equality.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that it would not adopt
any de minimis population variations for congressional districting
as being acceptable per se. 1 3 Thus, the Court refused to overrule
Kirkpatrick's paramount objective of absolute population equality." 4 Examining the apportionment plan at issue, the Court
found an absence of good faith to achieve population equality because several plans were introduced into the legislature with
smaller deviations. 115
Since the complainants proved that the state lacked good faith,
the burden shifted to the state to justify the population devia107. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
108. Id. at 727. The plan contained a 0.6984% total maximum deviation. Id. at 728.
109. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackman and O'Connor. Justice Stevens concurred in a separate opinion. Justice White
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell.
110. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731, 743.
111. Reiterating the Kirkpatrick standard, Justice Brennan noted the two questions
involved in congressional malapportionment cases. First, the court must analyze whether
the population disparities among districts could have been reduced or eliminated by a
good-faith effort to draw equipopulous districts. Parties challenging the redistricting
scheme bear the burden of proof on this issue. If the plaintiffs meet this burden, then the
state must prove that each significant variance among the districts was necessary to
achieve a legitimate goal. Id. at 730-31.
112. Id. at 731.
113. Id. at 734.
114. Id. at 732-33.
115. Id. at 738-39.
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tions.1 6 The Court listed several legislative policies which might
justify the variance, such as maintaining compact districts, following municipal boundaries, preserving the core of prior districts,
and avoiding contests among incumbents." 7 However, the state's
sole justification for the plan was preserving the voting strength of
racial minority groups.118 The Court found that the state had offered insufficient evidence to prove a causal relationship between
disparities.11 9 Consequently, the plan
this end and the population
20
was struck down.
The critical portion of the Karcher opinion is dictum. Justice
Stevens, the "decisive" ' 12 1 vote inthe case, wrote a concurring opinion in which he addressed the plaintiff's claim, advanced during
oral argument, that the district's bizarre configuration was sufficient to demonstrate lack of good faith. 22 Justice Stevens understood this as a political gerrymandering claim rather than a
malapportionment claim. Because Justice Stevens believed that
political gerrymandering constituted vote dilution under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, 1 23 he addressed at
gerrymandering and the standards for anlength the legal basis for
124
claim.
a
such
alyzing
Justice Stevens contended that the judiciary's preoccupation
with the goal of perfect population equality is an inadequate
25
method of judging the constitutionality of any redistricting plan.1
He argued that absolute population equality does not guarantee
equal representation because it is perfectly compatible with gerrymandering. 26 Justice Stevens also criticized the invidious discrim116. Id. at 740.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Justice Stevens proclaimed himself to be the decisive vote in his concurring opinion. Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 746-47. Justice Stevens stated that the equal protection clause, not article
I, § 2, requires every state to govern impartially and guarantees equal representation. Id.
at 748. Justice Stevens further noted that the equal protection clause prohibits vote dilution of cognizable political groups as well as racial groups. Id.
124. Id. at 744.
125. Id. at 750.
126. Id. at 752 n.10 (citing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). In fact, Justice Stevens argued that an absolute population equality standard
may be counterproductive. Computers now make it possible to generate, in a relatively
short period of time, a large number of alternative plans consistent with equal population
guidelines and to analyze the political characteristics of each plan in considerable detail.
By contrast, "[iln the 1970's round of reapportionment, some states were barely able to
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ination standard for judging gerrymandering claims as
inadequate. 2 " To remedy this inadequacy, he developed his own
test to determine the constitutionality of districting
three-part
28
plans.
In the third part of Justice Stevens' concurrence, he explained
why the New Jersey redistricting plan violated the equal protection
clause. First, he described the district configurations as "uncouth"
and "bizarre.' 29 Second, he believed that the procedural process
leading to the map's adoption was not neutral because it was
designed to increase the number of30Democrats that the state would
send to Congress in future years. 1
Justice White dissented in Karcher, protesting the Court's insistence on absolute population equality.13 He argued that this strict
standard does not meet the Reynolds and Wesberry requirement of
"fair and effective representation" of citizens because it does not
prevent deliberate partisan gerrymandering. 132 According to Justice White, the standards for dealing with state legislative apportionment are more sensible.' 33 Justice White also favored a
permissible de minimis range of population deviation in congressional districting cases."' Under Justice White's approach, cases
with deviations falling within the allowed de minimis range would
be per se constitutional, unless complainants could prove that the
13
plan invidiously discriminated against a racial or political group. 1
Consequently, Justice White would have upheld the Karcher plan
generate a single reapportionment plan in the time alloted to the task." Karcher, 462
U.S. at 752 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 753-54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613, 642-43 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
128. The test is: (1) whether the plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group; (2) whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity; and
(3) whether the state can produce convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves
neutral, legitimate community interests. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
129. Id. at 762.
130. Id. at 763-64. The plan was sponsored by the Democratic party leadership,
which controlled both houses of the state legislature. The governor, a Democrat, signed
the plan into law the day before the inauguration of a Republican governor. Other more
neutral plans were rejected because they did not "reflect the leadership's partisan concerns." Id. In sum, the record indicated that the map-making procedure was far from
neutral. Id.
131. Id. at 766 (White, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 776 n.12.
133. Id. at 771.
134. Id. at 780.
135. Id. at 783.
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because it contained less than a one percent total maximum population deviation.
Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, also expressed concern that
an absolute equality standard encourages partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Powell stated that the injuries resulting from gerrymandering are unconstitutional because they violate the redistricting goal
'
of "fair and effective representation."136
But since the issue of unconstitutional gerrymandering was not addressed in the district
court, the Court, 1according
to Justice Powell, could not directly
37
rule on this issue.
The Court will address the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering for the first time in Davis v. Bandemer,'31 which was
argued October 7, 1985. At issue in Davis is the 1980 redistricting
of the Indiana General Assembly. 139 The subcommittee in charge
of redistricting the state was comprised entirely of members of the
Republican Party, since they controlled both houses of the General
Assembly.' 4° The Republican State Committee hired a computer
firm to draw the subcommittee's proposed map.'
The map was
revealed during the last week of the 1981 regular session, and
42
Democrats were given only forty hours to review the entire map. 1
Members of the committee stated that the goal of the map was "to
save as many incumbent Republicans as possible."' 14 3 The redistricting bill was passed by both houses with voting following party
lines. 144 The governor, also a Republican, signed the bill in May of
1981.145 Democrats sued, claiming that the map was a partisan
gerrymander which violated their rights under the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. 146 The district court agreed,
136. Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated:
A legislator cannot represent his constituents properly-nor can voters from a
fragmented district exercise the ballot intelligently-when a voting district is
nothing more than an artificial unit divorced from, and indeed often in conflict
with, the various communities established in the State . . . . I therefore am
prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering ....
Id.
137.
138.
(1985).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 790.
603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984), prob. juris noted, 105 S. Ct. 1840, 1841
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1482.
1483.
1483-84.
1484.

at 1482.
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and ordered the state to redraw the maps by December 31, 1985.147
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction4 M and stayed 49the
district court's order pending a Court decision on the merits.1
B. Equipopulous Gerrymandering-Ketchumv. Byrne
Ketchum v. Byrne150 was an action contesting the 1981 Chicago
City Council redistricting plan for the city's fifty aldermanic
wards. 5 ' In April and May of 1981, the Commissioner of the
city's Planning Department and former alderman Thomas E.
Keane152 drafted a new ward map following the 1980 census
figures, which reflected significant increases in the Black and Hispanic populations during the past decade.' 53 In 1970, Blacks had a
population majority in fifteen wards. By 1980, Blacks, under the
1970 ward map, had a majority in nineteen wards and a 49.3 percent plurality in another. In 1970, Hispanics had no majority
ward. By 1980, under the 1970 map, they had four majority and
two plurality wards.' 54 Thus, in 1980, non-Hispanic whites had a
majority in twenty-two wards and a presumed plurality in two
other wards under the 1970 map.' 55 The map drawn by Keane
provided for twenty-four non-Hispanic White majority wards, seventeen Black majority wards, four Hispanic majority wards and
five wards with no majority. 56 The City Council adopted the map
147. Id. at 1496.
148. 105 S. Ct. 1840, 1841 (1985). Since a three-judge district court panel heard the
case under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982) appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
149. Davis v. Bandamer, 106 S. Ct. 402 (1985).
150. 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2673 (1985).
151. The City of Chicago is divided into fifty aldermanic wards. The City Council
must redistrict the city based on new census data by the December 1 following the taking
of a national census. Id. at 1400.
152. During the Chicago "Machine" era, Keane "was acknowledge to be second only
to Mayor Daley as a political power." Chi. Tribune, Feb. 26, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 1. In
1974, Keane was convicted of conspiracy and seventeen counts of mail fraud in connection with a "well-crafted, brilliantly conceived big money deal." Id.
153. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1400. The population changes were as follows:
1970
1980
Non-Hispanic White
65.5%
43.2%
Black
32.7%
39.8%
Hispanic
7.3%
14.0%
154. Id. at 1400-01.
155. Id. at 1401.
156. Id. Several other maps were proposed, but they received little consideration.
Furthermore, the City Council, using its home rule powers, passed an ordinance requiring that seventeen, rather than ten, aldermen had to vote against the redistricting ordinance before a substitute ordinance could be submitted to public referendum. Id.
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on November 30, 1981.157 In the summer of 1982, several groups

filed suit, including groups of Black and Hispanic voters. They
claimed that the City Council map violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended in 1982.158
The district court, after a two-month trial, found that the plan
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 159 The court based its
decision on the fact that the City Council map caused "retrogression. '"" The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' fourteenth and fifteenth amendment claims because the plaintiffs failed to prove
"invidious discrimination"

16'

by the City Council. The district

157. Id.
158. The plaintiffs alleged that the City Council map diluted majority voting strength
by using four techniques: fracturing, packing, retrogression and boundary manipulation.
Id. at 1402. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, states that:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of
this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (emphasis in original).
159. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1401-02.
160. Id. "Retrogression may be defined as a decrease in the new districting plan or
other voting scheme from the previous plan or scheme in the absolute number of representatives which a minority group has a fair chance to elect." Id. at 1402 n.2. As used in
the Ketchum case, the definition
refers to a reduction in the number of wards with an effective majority of the
relevant minority group from the number of such wards which existed immediately before the redistricting plan was instituted. The circumstances of retrogression suggest a shortfall in minority representation below what would have
been anticipated based on changes in overall population proportions.
Id. "[T]he non-retrogression rule requires the maintenance of representation at roughly
the same level as was formerly achieved." Id.
The City Council map caused retrogression from 19 Black majority wards in 1980
under the 1970 map to 17 Black majority wards under the 1981 City Council map. Id. at
1402. Also, Hispanics had a majority in four wards and a plurality in two others in 1980
under the 1970 map, while under the City Council map Hispanics had four majority
wards but no plurality wards. Id. at 1401.
161. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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court ordered the defendants to draw a new map, and required that
a Black majority be restored in two wards and a Hispanic majority
in four wards. 162 In addition, the court required that one Hispanic
ward be created. 163 The district court approved the defendants'
revised map, which changed seven wards, on December 23,
1982.164
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
claiming that the district court map did not effectively remedy the
alleged dilution of their voting strength. 165 The plaintiffs also
asked the appellate court to find that the City Council intentionally
the plaintiffs, violating their fourteenth
discriminated against
166
rights.
amendment
The Seventh Circuit first addressed issues arising from the Voting Rights Act claim. The court approved the lower court's finding of a section 2 violation, based on retrogression and the
manipulation of the racial voting population to achieve retrogression.167 The court next turned to the fourteenth amendment issue.
The court noted that the facts of this case were closely analogous
16
to other cases in which intentional discrimination was found. 1
162. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1401-02.
163. Id. at 1402.
164. Id. at 1401-02. The changes were as follows (Blacks are represented by "B,"
and Hispanics by "H"):
1982 Court-approved Map
1970 Map
Ward
60.09% B
66.36% B
15
61.65% B
76.39% B
37
75.55% H
62.80% H
22
65.37% H
51.10% H
25
58.83% H
50.70% H
26
57.38% H
53.61% H
31
46.30% H
47.90% H
32
Id at 1411.
165. The plaintiffs claimed that the district court's finding that a simple majority
(more than 50%) of voting age population constituted the only criterion for determining
whether a particular minority had a "reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of his
choice" was erroneous. Id. at 1402. The plaintiffs asked the appellate court to adopt a
65% minority population guideline for remedial purposes. Id.
166. Id. at 1402-03.
167. Id. at 1406. The appellate court analyzed the history of the Voting Rights Act
in detail. Prior to amendment of section 2 of the Act, which had been judicially construed to follow the fifteenth amendment, a violation could be found only if invidious
discrimination was proved. Id. at 1403 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 6061 (1980)). The 1982 amendment eliminated the invidious requirement by substituting a
"results" test for the "purpose" test. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1403. Under this new standard, the court was to assess the impact of the challenged plan using objective factors and
applying a "totality of circumstances" test. Id. The factors to be considered are derived
from White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1404.
168. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1407-09. The court noted that several factors in this case
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Despite the similarities, the court found it unnecessary to make a
formal finding that the 1981 map constituted intentional racial discrimination.' 69 The court was reluctant to apply the difficult fourteenth amendment analysis because Congress had rendered it
superfluous by amending the Voting Rights Act. 170
The court then addressed the map approved by the district court
in 1982, which attempted to remedy the racial discrimination that
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit
found the district court map inadequate because it did not completely eliminate the illegal dilution of minority voting strength
caused by the City Council map. 71 The appellate court held that

the district court map did not give minority citizens a fair and reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 172 Therefore, since the Seventh Circuit did not have the authority to
formulate its own redistricting plan, it remanded the case to the
voter dilution problems found in the
district court to remedy 1the
73
1982 district court map.
On remand, the district court on December 27, 1985 approved a
settlement map drawn by the parties. 174 The compromise map
remedied the fracturing of the Hispanic community by creating
four supermajority wards. 75 The compromise map also further inwere similar to those in Rybicki v State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill.
1982), in which the district court held that the 1980 redistricting plan for the Illinois
General Assembly unconstitutionally diluted Black voting strength in districts on Chicago's south and west sides. The Rybicki court ordered that adjustments in the map be
made to remedy this dilution. The similar factors included: (1) retrogression; (2) boundary manipulation (by displacing Black majorities in two wards); (3) packing (by wasting
Black votes through unnecessary concentration); and (4) fracturing (certain parts of the
Black and Hispanic communities, which could have been used to form additional Black
and Hispanic wards, were instead split to form sizeable Black and Hispanic minorities
within White majority wards). Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1409.
169. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1409.
170. Id. See supra note 167 for a discussion of the Voting Rights Act. The court
noted that there appeared to be no difference in the available remedy regardless of how
the discrimination was characterized. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1409-10.
171. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1412.
172. Id. The district court had rejected the use of any majority greater than 50% of
the voting age population in most wards for determining what constituted an effective
voting majority in Black and Hispanic wards. Id. at 1411. The appellate court found
that this was an abuse of discretion because the district court should have considered the
use of "supermajorities" (frequently 65% of total population or 60% of voting age population) to adjust for the unusually lower voter registration and turnout for certain minorities. Id. at 1413.
173. Id. at 1412. The appellate court did provide the district court with detailed
guidelines to follow on remand. Id. at 1412-17.
174. Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
175. Id. at 557-58. The changes in these four wards were as follows (the figures in
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creased the Black population in two Black majority wards, 1 while
creating a Black majority in total population and a White majority
in voting age population in a third ward. 77 Three days later, the
district court ordered special aldermanic and committee elections. 178 The district court noted that dilution of minority voting
strength may have affected the outcome of aldermanic and committee elections,' 79 and that the changes in these wards from the
1982 court-approved map could mean the difference between "illegal vote dilution and an effective opportunity for Blacks and Hispanics to participate fairly in the electoral process."'8 0 The district
76

parentheses are percentages of voting age population ("VAP") as opposed to percentages
of total population ("TP")):
1982
1981 City
Court1985
Council
approved
Compromise
Ward
1970 Map
Map
Map
Map
22
25
26
31
176.

Ward

62.8
51.1
50.7
53.6

(56.7)
(44.9)
(41.9)
(48.4)

64.88
52.56
52.34
57.26

(59.88)
(46.16)
(43.68)
(52.41)

75.55
65.37
58.83
57.37

(69.0)
(59.5)
(50.0)
(50.6)

78.1
72.9
64.2
59.6

(71.77)
(66.74)
(57.69)
(52.35)

Id. at 560-61. The changes in these two wards were as follows:
1981 City
1982 Court1985
Council
approved
Compromise
1970 Map
Map
Map
Map

66.36 (59.99)
41.69 (34.59)
60.09 (52.6)
15
76.39 (72.42)
36.84 (31.21)
61.65 (56.2)
37
Id. at 560.
177. Id. at 561. The percentage breakdown was as follows:
Ward
Black
White

74.5 (68.0)
80.4 (77.6)

18
51.44 (46.6)
48.32 (50.3)
Id. at 562.
178. Id. at 568.
179. Id. at 565.
180. Id. at 567. The changes, reflecting an establishment of "effective majorities,"
were as follows (these figures reflect percentage of total population ("TP")):

Ward

1970 Map

15
18
37
22
25
26
31
Id.

66.36%
49.30%
76.39%
62.81%
51.10%
50.66%
53.61%

B
B
B
H
H
H
H

Courtapproved
Map
69.09%
46.37%
61.65%
75.55%
65.37%
58.33%
57.38%

B
B
B
H
H
H
H

Proposed
1985 Plan
74.29%
50.03%
80.45%
78.11%
72.95%
64.20%
59.59%

B
B
B
H
H
H
H

Differences
14.20%
3.66%
18.80%
2.56%
7.58%
5.37%
2.21%

B
B
B
H
H
H
H
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court further noted that since the City Council remapped the city
in 1981, there had been no fair aldermanic or committeemen elections in these seven wards. 81 Finally, the district court stated that
its order was motivated by the court's awareness of the importance
of the right to vote and the deleterious consequences to a democis permitted to dilute
racy that arise whenever racial discrimination
1 82
and distort a group's voting strength.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court entered the redistricting "thicket" in the
early 1960's to ensure fair and effective representation for all citizens. 83 Unfortunately, the judicially created standards that were
developed to attain this goal have created confusion, inefficiency
and endless litigation. 8 4 More importantly, however, even if judicially manageable and consistent standards are developed, fair and
effective representation cannot be fully guaranteed by the courts as
long as the majority party85 of the legislature is allowed to control
the redistricting process.1
A.

The Inadequacy of Judicially Created Standards

Case-by-case adjudication of redistricting claims has produced a
myriad of ever changing standards 18 6 which make it difficult for
legislatures, attorneys and lower courts to understand which redistricting schemes are constitutionally permissible. 8 7 For example,
in the congressional redistricting area, the Kirkpatrick v. Preisler
decision,18 1 which developed the "absolute equality" standard, categorically rejected numerous state justifications for population inequality. According to the Kirkpatrick Court, preservation of
political subdivisions and ensuring compact districts were not justifiable reasons for population inequality.1 89 Yet the Court in 1983,
addressing the same issue in Karcher v. Daggett, 9° stated that cer181. Id. at 568. City-wide elections were held in 1983 and 1984, using the 1982
court-approved plan. These were the elections that the plaintiffs were challenging. Id. at
565.
182. Id. at 568.
183. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
184. See infra notes 186-219.
185. See infra notes 221-32.
186. See supra notes 35-100 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 189-92.
188. 394 U.S. 526 (1969); see supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
189. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 344 U.S. 526, 533-36 (1969); see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
190. 462 U.S. 725 (1983); see also supra notes 107-37 and accompanying text.
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683

tain legislative policies, such as compact districts, respect for municipal boundaries, and preserving the core of prior districts, would
justify population variances. 91 Quite clearly, both the Court and
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Kirkpatrick
and the plurality opinion in Karcher, have changed their positions
on this issue. Additionally, since all recent redistricting cases have
led to closely divided decisions,1 92 further changes in redistricting
standards may occur in 1990. Lastly, many of the Court's decisions either upholding or invalidating redistricting plans have limited precedential value, because every reapportionment case has its
own unique combination of circumstances. 193
The result of these various and unstable redistricting standards
is endless litigation, 94 in which the judiciary becomes a redistricting agency that draws almost as many redistricting maps as the
legislatures.' 95 Whether cartographers redistricting congressional
districts in 1990 can consider such policies as making districts
compact and following municipal boundaries is unknown, since the
statement in the Karcher opinion that such policies are justifiable is
dictum.'96 This uncertainty will probably lead to extensive litigation in the early 1990's, with states and cities again spending taxpayers' money to defend these
redistricting plans, and in some
97
instances, to make new ones.
The judicial branch since Baker v. Carr'9s has become a policymaker in the redistricting process by attempting to develop redistricting standards on a case-by-case basis.' 99 One reason that
the courts have developed so many constantly changing standards
for redistricting is that legislatures have bombarded the Court with
numerous schemes designed to dilute particular groups' votes and
thereby keep legislators in power. 200 Furthermore, the standards
191. Karcher, 462 U.S.. at 740.
192. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 725;
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
193. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 850 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing how extraordinarily narrow, and empty of precedential value, the holding
is); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 334 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
194. See infra note 195.
195. The ABA estimates that 25% to 35% of current congressional districts were
drawn by the courts. Karcher,462 U.S. at 778 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 20 (1981)).
196. Karcher, 762 U.S. at 740.
197. See Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
198. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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provided by the Court, even when capable of useful application, do
not provide minority groups a swift and effective remedy for invalid redistricting schemes, 20 1 since court-ordered maps are not typically redrawn until mid-decade.20 2 Since the judiciary's attempts
to develop consistent and manageable standards in the reapportionment area have been unsuccessful, Congress, as the branch best
suited for efficient policymaking, must promulgate detailed and
concrete reapportionment standards. Moreover, uhtil redistricting
is taken out of majority party control, fair and effective representation, which is the goal of redistricting, 20 3 will not be achieved.
B.

The Ineffectiveness of a JudicialRemedy

Discriminatory election districts are inevitable when the legislature's majority party is allowed unfettered control of the redistricting process. 2° Allowing representatives whose livelihoods depend
upon reelection to draw their own districts invites unfairness. 0 5
Incumbent legislators will always be tempted to find some method
by which the system may be manipulated to their advantage, regardless of what the law states.20 6 Today, the tactic is equipopulous gerrymandering, accomplished with the aid of sophisticated
computers. The majority party's incumbent legislators can incorporate politically relevant information into the computer's data
base, generating a detailed political and racial profile of the political unit.20 7 The computer can then produce thousands of redistricting plans, with the majority incumbents selecting the one that
201. See infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
202. For example, Davis v. Bandemer was filed in January of 1982. The validity of
the map was still in question in June of 1986 because the Supreme Court had not yet
rendered its decision. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). Ketchum
v. Byrne was filed in the summer of 1982, and elections under the first valid map were
held on March 18, 1986. Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
Additionally, the constant changing of district lines shifts citizens among several districts. For example, some Chicago citizens residing at the same address since 1968 have
been placed in five different wards. Chi. Tribune, Mar. 3, 1986, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
203. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
204. See supra notes 13-100 and accompanying text.
205. For instance, the Keane family controlled Chicago's 31st ward from 1931-1978.
Chi. Tribune, Mar. 3, 1986, § 1, at 9, col. 1. Special attention was given to this ward
during redistricting. See Chicago City Council v. Cousins, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974).
206. See, e.g., supra notes 13-100 and accompanying text.
207. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 208-10. For a further discussion of the use of the
computer to promote partisan and racial gerrymandering, see Karcher,462 U.S. at 785
n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting); Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1483-86 (S.D. Ind.
1984); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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optimizes their chances of reelection.20 The computer makes vote
dilution extremely difficult to prove. A few percentage points in
20 9
each of several districts can alter the outcome of an election.
Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether a redistricting
plan illegally dilutes a group's vote until after an election has been
held under the plan. As Ketchum v. Byrne 21 ° and Bandemer v.
Davis2 1 indicate, the majority party can effectively use the com-

puter to maximize its stronghold, making it difficult for the judiciary to remedy the discriminatory effects until the middle of the
decade.21 2
Giving the majority party free reign in the redistricting process
has several negative consequences. First, the current system
wastes judicial and legislative resources. The American Bar Association estimates that thirty-five percent of current House district
lines were drawn by the courts,213 with many cases taking over
three years to litigate.214 Unfortunately, the courts will decennially
perform this function under the current system. Both the 1970 and
1980 redistricting schemes in the City of Chicago and the State of
Indiana involved extensive litigation, with the Indiana scheme
reaching the Supreme Court both times. 215 As an example of what
208. Justice Harlan foresaw the potential abuses of computers when he wrote in
1969: "A computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular
will on an overwhelming number of critical issues ....

[D]istrict lines are likely to be

drawn to maximize the political advantage of the party temporarily dominant in public
affairs." Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. For instance, of the seven wards ordered to hold special elections in Ketchum v.
City Council, three contained population differences of less than four percent between the
1982 court-approved map and the 1985 compromise map. Ketchum v. Byrne, 630 F.
Supp. 551, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see supra note 180.
210. See supra notes 150-82 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 202.
213. See supra note 195.
214. See supra note 202.
215. The Chicago City council map drawn after the 1970 census was contested on
grounds of racial and ethnic gerrymandering in Cousins v. City Council, 322 F. Supp.
428 (N.D. Il. 1971), rev'd, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
The district court in Cousins, on remand, found that the 7th ward boundaries were the
product of purposeful racial discrimination and ordered a remap and special election in
the 7th ward. Cousins v. City Council, 361 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The appellate
court reversed, finding that invidious discrimination had not been proved. Cousins v.
City Council, 503 F. 2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974).
The Cousins case, however, might be decided differently today since proof of invidious
discrimination is no longer required. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. In
any event, litigation over the map, in a close case, took over three years.
Interestingly, the 1970 City Council map was also drawn by Alderman Thomas Keane,
who at the time was chairman of the Council Committee on Finance. The court found
several instances in which Alderman Keane considered the race of residents when draw-
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may be expected in 1990 if history repeats itself, the majority party
or group in control of the Chicago City Council in 1990 will use
the computer to devise a redistricting plan that will benefit the majority,2" 6 and the minority party or group will in all likelihood challenge the plan as unconstitutionally discriminatory.217 In fact, if a
Black majority gains control of the Chicago City Council and
remaps the districts in 1990, the courts may face reverse discrimination claims filed by white voters. An entirely new group of challenges may arise, generating lengthy, complex and costly litigation.
The current system wastes legislative as well as judicial resources, because a redistricting plan invalidated by the courts is
useless. 218 A new map must be drawn, and special elections must
be held in some instances.21 9 Consequently, the legislature may
spend far more of the taxpayers' money redistricting than it would
have spent had a nondiscriminatory map been drawn at the
outset.22 °
Besides being inefficient, the current redistricting system pollutes
the American electoral system, as well as our representational government's basic ideal-a voter's opportunity to immediately influence public policy through the election of a representative.221
Examples of this pollution are present in almost every redistricting
scheme that has been invalidated.222 In Chicago, for example, voters in 1983 elected a Black mayor, Harold Washington. Gerrymandered districts could not prevent his election, since the
mayoral election is based on the candidate receiving a plurality of
ing the district lines. See Cousins, 466 F.2d at 834-38; Cousins, 503 F.2d at 918-19. Thus,
both of Keane's maps were contested as racially discriminatory.
Similarly, the same two counties which the NAACP plaintiffs in Bandemer v. Davis,
603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984), see supra notes 138-49, alleged were discriminatory
multimember schemes had been at issue in the multimember scheme of Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), ten years earlier. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying
text. (Both cases involved Marion County, which includes Indianapolis, and Lake
County, which includes Gary.).
216. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 215. Since legislative redistricting became a justiciable issue after
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the last two Chicago City Council maps have been
challenged, the 1970 map in Cousins v. City Council, see supra note 215, and the 1980
map in Ketchum v. Byrne, see supra notes 150-82 and accompanying text.
218. The legislature, of course, cannot use the original map once it has been
invalidated.
219. See Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. I11.1985).
220. For example, Chicago's expenditures for 1980 redistricting included the costs of
the original map, the 1982 court-approved map, the 1985 compromise map, the 1986
special elections and four years of litigation.
221. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
222. See, e.g., infra notes 223-31.
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the city-wide vote. Washington obtained this plurality mainly because Blacks comprised nearly forty percent of the city's population by 1980.223

However, the gerrymandered 1980 city election

map possibly prevented Washington backers from gaining control
of the City Council. 224 After the 1983 election, the City Council
contained 29 anti-Washington alderman (the "29" faction) and 21
pro-Washington aldermen (the "21" faction). 225 As a result, most
of the key City Council chairmanships went to the "29" faction,
which until a recent special election controlled the City Council.2 2 6
The "29" faction stymied scores of Mayor Washington's appointments and programs. 227 The situation caused heated battles between the Mayor and the "29" faction from the first day he took
office. 228 Since the court-ordered special election 229 produced a
pro-Washington majority in the City Council, it is clear that the
1980 City Council map unfairly prevented voters, for three years,
from properly influencing public policy through the electoral system. 23° Further, the City Council passed legislation for three years
which did not reflect the true "majority will" 23 1 of Chicago. This

situation demonstrates that any judicial remedy will have a delayed
effect, and that aggrieved voters may be powerless to prevent sev223. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1400 (7th Cir. 1984).
224. Washington and his backers did not gain control of the City Council until April
30, 1986. The breakthrough came after the court-ordered special elections, see Ketchum
v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985); supra notes 174-82 and accompanying
text, turned the Mayor's 21-29 disadvantage in the City Council into a 25-25 tie. Washington, with his tie-breaking vote as Mayor, thus achieved control of the City Council.
Associated Press, May 26, 1986 (available June 1, 1986 on NEXIS, Associated Press Political Service file).
225. Associated Press, Jan. 26, 1986 (available June 1, 1986 on NExis, Associated
Press file).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. On May 2, 1983, Washington's first City Council session as Mayor, he adjourned the meeting without a voice vote. The "29" reconvened the meeting and
awarded themselves powerful committee chairmanships. Associated Press, Oct. 1, 1984
(available June 1, 1986 on NEXis, Associated Press file).
229. Ketchum v. City Council, 630 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
230. The Chicago City Council committees were reorganized on June 6, 1986. This
reorganization was possible because Mayor Washington and his supporters had control of
the council through Washington's tie-breaking vote. Fifteen aldermen allied with Mayor
Washington were installed as chairmen of key council committees previously headed by
aldermen opposed to Washington. Thirteen of the remaining committees were structured
so that each contained a pro-Washington majority. Chi. Tribune, Aug. 1, 1986, § 1, at 1,
col. 5. Thus, legislation supported by Mayor Washington could be implemented for the
first time since Washington's election in April of 1983.
231. See Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the
Emerging PoliticalEquality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1619 n.23 (1983) for a
discussion of the importance of majority will in political theory.
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V.

ALTERNATIVES

In order to ensure fair and effective elections, Congress must develop a neutral redistricting system for congressional, state and
municipal election districts, while also promulgating detailed standards to govern the redistricting procedure. Congress has the authority to enact such changes under article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution (the "Guarantee Clause"), which provides that:
"[tihe United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
republican form of government....
A republican government can be defined as a government which
derives its powers from consent of the great body of society, not
just a privileged few. 3 For this consent to be derived from the
great body of society, there must be an electorial process which
ensures effective representation.235 State and city legislatures that
are elected from malapportioned and gerrymandered election districts are, therefore, unrepublican governments.236 In fact, the
Court has recognized that malapportioned or gerrymandered dis232. Id.
233. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
234. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 558-60 (1962).
235. Bonfield, supra note 234, at 560; see also W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 522-41 (1950).
Professor Crosskey provided an in-depth analysis of the Guarantee Clause. In analyzing the words "every State" in the clause, Crosskey believed that the words were intended
to apply to the people of the states, not to their governments. Id. at 522. Crosskey also
believed that the Guarantee Clause can be used by Congress to regulate national, state
and local elections. He stated:
For "Republican Government," beyond the possibility of argument, is representative government; and since the representative character of any government
necessarily depends upon the popular right to vote, it inevitably results that the
popular right of voting in the government of our states, and of voting therein in
an effective way, is the thing to which this national guaranty most essentially
appertains .... And because unrepublican systems frequently begin with encroachments on the right to vote, prophylactic protections of this popular right
of voting seem the manifest means by which the national guarantee against
these unrepublican systems is to be peacefully performed.
Id. at 523.
Crosskey further noted that Congress, using the Guarantee Clause, could pass laws to
wipe out unrepublican districting and gerrymandering. Id.
Finally, Crosskey believed that Congress has the power to pass these laws because "as
the 'supreme' organ of the nation, it has the duty, 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper' to guarantee this right of voting, to the people of 'every State.'" Id.
236. Bonfield, supra note 234, at 560.
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tricts may be remedied by Congress under the Guarantee
Clause.237 Congress, however, has not used the Guarantee Clause
since the Civil War when it invoked the clause to pass and enforce
the Reconstruction Acts.23 8 After the fourteenth amendment was
passed to remedy many actions deemed unrepublican,239 Congress
used the amendment to exert power over the states, and the Guarantee Clause became dormant.
Analysis of partisan gerrymandering claims under the fourteenth amendment, and racial gerrymandering claims under the fifteenth amendment, cannot guarantee a republican government. 2 "
First, the amendments require unconstitutional "state action"
before they can be invoked.24 For example, the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause begins with: "No state shall make
or enforce any law .... "242 Furthermore, the fifteenth amendment
provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
.... 243 Because of the wording, these amendments have been
almost exclusively used as negative limitations on state action,
rather than affirmative obligations of state or local governments. 2 "
Thus, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments can only remedy
invalid redistricting maps, rather than devising any procedure to
make them valid from the outset. As a result, these amendments
have been unsuccessful in remedying the unfairness a gerrymandered or malapportioned districting plan creates until the middle of the decade. 245

Furthermore, courts have been unable to

formulate judicially manageable standards.246
Congress, using the Guarantee Clause, can promulgate detailed
standards for congressional, state and local redistricting. Congress
237. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-27 (1962) ("the appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the Guaranty Clause"). Justice Frankfurter in his dissent
noted: "It [the plaintiff's claim] is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading
under a different label." Id. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan in Reynolds noted that: "it can, I think, be shown beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be imposed
by the Republican Form of Government Clause .... Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
591 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238. Bonfield, supra note 234, at 536-58.
239. Id. at 514.
240. See supra notes 221-32.
241. Bonfield, supra note 234, at 514.
242.
243.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

244. Bonfield, supra note 234, at 514; see, e.g., supra notes 150-82 and accompanying
text.
245. See supra note 202.
246. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
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can also use the Guarantee Clause to help ensure a republican form
of government by making the redistricting process more neutral.
At the very least, Congress should prohibit exclusive control by the
majority party over the redistricting process. 24 7 Congressional action would, it is hoped, help to ensure fair redistricting at the beginning of the decade, thus reducing the volume of litigation in the
middle of the decade and the expense to taxpayers caused by invalidation of redistricting schemes.248 Courts, instead of being policymakers, would merely be called upon to determine whether
congressional standards were followed by the cartographers. This
would add stability and predictability to the very confused redistricting area.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court became involved in the redistricting issue in 1962, in
an attempt to remedy the gross inequities in election districts.
Although the Court's one person, one vote standard has curbed the
effects of malapportioned districts, it has been unable to effectively
remedy the evils today's computers can create through gerrymandered districts. As a result, voters are unable to exert their
proper influence on public policy. Consequently, Lincoln's vision
of "government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people" 249 too often becomes government of the incumbents, by the
incumbents, and for the incumbents. In order to achieve a republi247. Professor Robert G. Dixon, Jr., the foremost expert in the reapportionment
field, was a zealous advocate of bipartisan (or, in Chicago's case, bifunctional) commissions as a way of improving redistricting procedures. Dixon believed that the use of a
bipartisan commission with a tie-breaker device would operate as "an essential built-in
check on both conscious and unconscious unfairness in the resulting districts." Dixon
analogized such a commission to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Just as the FTC
considers all relevant data regarding competition and eliminates unfair competition on a
case-by-case basis, a bipartisan commission would consider all data regarding political
and electoral behavior. The two are analogous because "the bipartisan commission simply deals with competition in another form-political competition for political seats in
the political assembly." The goal of such a commission would be neutrality. This could
be accomplished by considering all data on electoral behavior in order to test and discard
plans which would create artificial majorities in the legislative assembly. Also, a plan
developed by a bipartisan commission, although still subject to judicial review, would
contain a strong presumption of representational fairness. Dixon, EstablishingLegislative
Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 10-11 (B. Grofman, A.
Lijphart, R. McKay, H. Scarrow eds. 1982).
248. See supra note 220.
249. Address by President Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 19, 1863, in Gettysburg, Pa., reprinted in GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 420-21 (1985).
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can government, Congress must make the redistricting process
more neutral from the outset.
TRACY

D. KASSON

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The Supreme Court decided Davis v. Bandemer after this comment went to press. The Court ruled 6-3 that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the equal protection clause.
The Court then voted 7-2 to uphold the Indiana redistricting
scheme because there was no showing that the Indiana electoral
system, either statewide or locally, consistently degraded the Democrats' influence over the political process. See Davis v. Bandemer,
106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).

